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Hua Yang
Old Dominion University, 2010
Director: Dr. Mohammad Najand
Since the adoption of U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule lOb-18 Safe
Harbor for Issuer Repurchases in 1982, stock repurchases have been growing
explosively. Extant literature has shed some light on the motivation behind companies'
repurchase activities. The most popular beliefs include signaling undervaluation (Dann
1981, Vermaele 1981, Comment and Jarrell 1991), reducing free cash flow (Guay and
Harford 2000, Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach 2000, Grullon and Michaely 2004),
raising leverage ratio (Hovakimian, Op1er and Titman 2001) and increasing earnings
(Bens, Nagar, Skinner and Wong 2003).
Motivated by Stephens and Weisbach's (1998) research which found that companies on
average acquire 74 to 82 percent of the shares announced as repurchase targets within
three years of the repurchase announcement, I re-examined the motivations for stock
repurchase by linking repurchase announcements with actual repurchases: 1) why some
companies announce stock repurchase, but don't actually buy back any of their shares,
and 2) why some companies complete the repurchase program as announced.
Applying Logit regression to investigate the motives, I find that companies which make
repurchase announcements but not actually buy back any stock tend to use
announcements to signal undervaluation, so they don't need to actually purchase their
stocks to covey the insider information once again. On the other side, those companies
which complete repurchase programs are more likely to buy back shares to reduce free
cash flow, raise leverage ratio or improve earning per share. And they have to actually
repurchase their own stocks to achieve those purposes.
I also examine market reaction to announcements made by Non-Repurchaser and
Repurchaser. Non-Repurchaser receives more favorable market responses than
Repurchaser. It provides further support to my hypothesis that Non-Repurchaser is
undervalued and market corrects the mistake after the repurchase announcement.
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1.0 INTRODUCTION
The adoption of US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Rule 10b- 18 Safe
Harbor for Issuer Repurchases in 19821 set up guidelines that a company must follow in
stock repurchase program so as to exempt from liabilities for price manipulation. Since
then stock repurchase has emerged as an increasingly important payout method
complementing cash dividend.
From 1985 to 1990 aggregate net repurchases were in the $30 billion range. After a
slowdown during the recession of early 1990s, the value of repurchases, for the first time
in 1998, outnumbered cash dividends for US companies. Such trend continued in 1999,
2000, 2004 and 2005 (Lazo 2007). In 2007 the dollar amount of stock repurchases by
S&P 500 companies reached a record high of $586 billion, more than double the amount
ofdividend payouts (Richardson and Zuckerman 2008).
This explosive growth in stock repurchase has invited research interest in academic field.
A large portion of papers shed light on the rationales behind stock buybacks. The most
1 See Grullon and Michaely (2002) for a detailed description on the creation of Rule 10b- 1 8 and how the
Rule affected stock repurchase activity.
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popular beliefs include signaling undervaluation (Dann 1981, Vermaele 1981, Comment
and Jarrell 1991), reducing free cash flow (Guay and Harford 2000, Jagannathan,
Stephens and Weisbach 2000, Grullon and Michaely 2004), raising leverage ratio
(Hovakimian, Op1er and Titman 2001) and improving earning per share (Bens, Nagar,
Skinner and Wong 2003).
Rule 10b- 18 is a voluntary "safe harbor". Companies are not required to issue repurchase
announcements even after the adoption of the Rule i ? 1982, but if they want to be
protected from charges against price manipulation, they must follow Safe Harbor
provisions to announce their intent to repurchase stock beforehand and to make
repurchases satisfying the four conditions of Rule 10b- 18 regarding manner, timing, price
and volume ofthe repurchase.
In practice most companies do announce stock repurchases, however companies are not
required to fulfill their commitments after declaring buyback programs to the public.
Stephens and Weisbach (1998) find that "from 1981 to 1990, firms on average acquire 74
to 82 percent of the shares announced as repurchase targets within three years of the
repurchase announcement". Extant literatures have covered various issues regarding
repurchase announcements or actual repurchases, but fail to disclose why some
companies buy back stocks as announced while others don't, and what is the motivation
behind those companies that announce repurchase programs but don't actually buy back a
single share after the announcements?
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This paper is designed to test the motives for stock repurchases, but it differs from its
precedents in that I will link repurchase announcement with actual repurchase, and
differentiate companies that fulfill their commitments from those that only announce
buyback programs but do not take actions. To my knowledge no publication so far has
ever taken a close look at the characteristics and motivations ofthose Non-Repurchasers.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section Two reviews repurchase
literatures and develops hypotheses for testing. Section Three tests hypotheses and
centers on the different motivations behind Non-Repurchasers and Repurchasers. The
comparison of market reaction after buyback announcement between the two groups will
be presented in Section Four. Section Five concludes.
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2.0 LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES
Numerous studies have cited various motivations for share buyback. The most popular
and widely accepted theories include undervaluation signaling motive, free cash flow
motive, financial leverage motive and earning per share motive.
2.1 Undervaluation Signaling
The separation of ownership from control enables managers to possess more information
of the company than the shareholders. In addition to financial statement, managers can
convey their inside information to public through other channels like payout policy
(Miller and Modigliani 1961, Miller and Rock 1985). The most well known motives
associated with stock repurchase is the so called "undervaluation signaling". Usually
share buybacks are announced after prolonged declines in share prices. Managers use
repurchase announcement as a "news bulletin" that they are convinced the stocks are
undervalued (Asquith and Mullins 1986). Therefore, it will be profitable for the
company to acquire its own stocks at bargain price and reissue them when the price
bounces back. Various researches have detected short-term abnormal return following
announcements of stock repurchase (Dann 1981, Vermaele 1981, Comment and Jarrell
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1991, Grullon and Michaely 2002, Webb 2008). Value stocks, which are more likely to
be undervalued, experience significant long-term abnormal return after initial stock
repurchase announcement, while no such positive drift in abnormal return is observed for
glamour stocks (Ikenberry, Lakonishok and Vermaelen 1995). A recent study (Peyer and
Vermaelen 2009) confirms that such underreaction to undervaluation still persists for
open market repurchases from 1991 to 2001. In addition, Jagannathan and Stephens
(2003) find that infrequent repurchases receive more positive market reaction than
frequent repurchases. The possible reason may be that companies which repurchase
stocks frequently may do so to substitute dividend increase rather than to signal
mispricing. Compared with their counterparties, infrequent repurchasers appear to be
smaller firms with low market-to-book ratio and high degree of asymmetric information.
Therefore, infrequent repurchasers are likely to be undervalued. Comment and Jarrell
(1991) compare the signaling power of three most common forms of stock repurchase:
Dutch-auction self-tender offer, fixed-price self-tender offer and open-market share
repurchase program. In fixed-price offers, managers set the terms of trade including a
fixed purchase price. However, for Dutch-auction offer, it is the outsiders who establish
the term of trade by submitting their tendering price and managers only disclose to public
the market-clearing price. In open-market share repurchase program, shares are sought at
market price. Obviously among the three, fixed-price offers send out most insider
information about the degree of undervaluation, and open-market share repurchase
programs convey the least from managers. To test this hypothesis, Comment and Jarrell
examined the three types of repurchase announcements issued by US companies between
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1984 and 1989. In line with the signaling power, they find the average excess return is
about 11% for fixed-price self-tender offer, 8% for Dutch-auction self-tender offer and
2% for open-market share repurchase program. All these researches shed light on the
"undervaluation signaling" power from stock buyback. Generally, announcements made
out of this motivation are welcomed by favorable market reactions.
2.2 Free Cash Flow
Besides information asymmetry caused by divergence of ownership and control, publicly
held business organizations have to deal with another issue — agency cost. Jensen and
Meckling (1976) point out that in an agency relationship principal and agent face
different utility functions. To maximize its own utility, agent may not act in the best
interest ofprincipal and thus agency problem arises. Agency cost can include monitoring
cost from principal, bonding cost from agent as well as residual cost from the reduction
of principal's maximized welfare when no divergence occurs. In a business organization
setting, agency relationship exists between shareholder (principal) and manager (agent).
Mangers tend to overinvest so as to increase the size of the company and expand their
power of control. By taking cash out of managers' possession, it will make it harder for
managers to invest in projects with negative net present value, since it forces managers to
raise funds externally and encounter keener monitoring from capital market (Easterbrook
1984, Jensen 1986). Consistent with free cash flow hypothesis, Stephens and Weisbach
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(1998) find positive relationship between repurchase activity and level of cash flow.
Evidences also show that market reactions to repurchase announcements are more
positive among companies that are more likely to overinvest (Grullon and Michaely
2004). Jiraporn's (2006) research reveals that in companies with strong shareholder
rights, managers are less able to retain cash inside company for private benefit and are
more likely to send it out to shareholders in form of cash repurchases, while companies
with weak shareholder rights carry out less share repurchases. Likewise, Webb (2008)
also finds evidence in banking industry: board structure, especially the independence of
the board, is positively related to the extent and size of bank stock repurchase program.
Cash dividend used to be the dominant payout vehicle. However, stock repurchases
drastically increased after the adoption of Rule 10b- 18 in 1982. The dollar value of stock
repurchases surpassed cash dividends in late 1990s and doubled dividends in 2007 (Lazo
2007, Richardson and Zuckerman 2008). Consistently, Fama (2001) also recorded
"disappearing dividends". Does stock repurchase really substitute cash dividend as the
preferred cash distribution vehicle?
Share repurchase has several advantages over cash dividend. First, for individual
investor cash dividend was taxed at a higher personal ordinary income rate, while profit
from repurchase was taxed at a lower capital gain rate (Black 1976, Barclay and Smith
1988, Bagwell and Shoven 1989). Though Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2003 allows qualified dividends to be taxed at same rate as long-term capital gain,
stock repurchase is still subject to more favorable tax treatment. Shareholders have to
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pay tax on every dollar of cash dividends they receive. With stock buybacks,
shareholders who sold stocks only need to pay tax on the excess of selling price over their
cost basis and those who didn't sell can defer the tax payments until capital gains are
realized. Second, dividend payments always cause drops in the share prices after the ex-
dividend days (Jakob and Ma 2003), but stock repurchase announcements are usually
followed by price rallies (Comment and Jarrell 1991, Ikenberry, Lakonishok and
Vermaelen 1995, Peyer and Vermaelen 2009). Third, dividend payments imply to public
a long-term commitment. They are expected to be stabilized and maintained by the
company. Therefore, there will be serious penalties associated with dividend cut due to
companies' inability to meet the market expectation (Bajaj and Vijh 1990, Kaplan and
Reishus 1990, Denis, Denis and Sarin 1994). Ghosh and Woolridge (1988) report an
average 7% stock price decline three days surrounding the announcement of dividend cut.
Stock repurchase, on the other hand, does not signal commitment of any kind.
Repurchase announcement does not necessarily lead to actual repurchase activity and
repurchase this year does not necessitate repurchase in the following years.
In reality tax does not seem to be the determinant for payout decisions. As pointed out by
Miller and Modigliani (1961), "Strong as this tax push toward capital gains may be for
high-income individuals, however, it should be remembered that a substantial (and
growing) fraction of total shares outstanding is currently held by investors for whom
there is either no tax differential (charitable and educational institutions, foundations,
pension trusts, and low-income retired individuals) or where the tax advantage is, if
anything, in favor of dividends (casualty insurance companies and taxable corporations
9
generally)." This point ofview is echoed in a recent survey with 384 financial executives
who claim that tax considerations are not a dominant factor in their decisions about
whether to pay dividends or to increase dividends, or in their choice between repurchases
or dividends (Brav, Graham, Harvey and Michaely 2005).
No evidence shows that stock repurchases contribute to the reduction in dividend
payments (DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner 2000, Fama and French 2001, Grullon and
Michaely 2002). Disappearing dividends are largely due to changing characteristics of
publicly traded companies and their lower propensity to pay dividends. The surge in
stock repurchases results from the demand for an increase in payout ratio which
companies are reluctant to satisfy with dividend increase. In Brav, Graham, Harvey and
Michaely's (2005) survey, when asked how to do with extra funds from dividend cuts,
companies' first choice is to pay down debt, then followed by stock repurchases. This
result implies that managers don't view dividend and repurchase as "fluid, one-for-one
substitution". In addition, Brennan and Thakor (1990) as well as Lucas and McDonald
(1998) disclose that shareholders prefer dividend payments for small distributions, open
market stock repurchases for larger distributions and tender offer repurchases for the
largest distributions. Guay and Harford (2000), Jagannathan, Stephens and Weisbach
(2000), Lie (2000) and Skinner (2008) find that companies use dividends to distribute
permanent, recurring and stable cash flows, and use stock repurchases to distribute
transient, nonrecurring and volatile cash flows.
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According to Jain, Shekhar and Torbey (2009), though IPO firms prefer stock buyback to
dividend as payout mechanism, market responds equally positive to both. The choice
between repurchase and dividends is determined by fundamentally different
characteristics and motivation of the IPO firms. The decision to dividend payout is
driven by life cycle factors and investor preference to dividend, while the decision to
stock repurchase is more for undervaluation signaling purpose.
In short, more and more researches arrive at the same conclusion: cash dividend and
stock repurchase are not interchangeable, that is, one cannot and will not substitute the
other as the only payout method to distribute free cash flow. Instead they are
independent and complimentary to each other, serving for different purposes. Dividend
payments are used for sustainable, stable and small cash distributions. Stock buybacks are
mainly for temporary, volatile and large cash distributions.
2.3 Financial Leverage
Previous studies have validated the existence of optimal capital structure. According to
Modigliani and Miller's (1963) static trade-off theory, companies optimize their capital
structures by trading off the tax benefits of debt financing against the costs of financial
distress. Jensen and Meckling's (1976) agency theory implies that optimal capital
structure should minimize the sum of the agency cost associated with equity and the
agency cost associated with debt (Stulz 1990, Hart and Moore 1995). In signaling model,
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optimal capital structure results from the trade-off between the benefit of a higher market
value with increased leverage and the cost of credible debt signaling (Ross 1977). In line
with these theories, both academic research and field survey reveal that some optimal
capital structures do exist within companies (Bradley, Jarrell and Kim 1984, Graham and
Harvey 2001), and managements base their financing decisions on some long-run target
leverage (Marsh 1982, Jalilvand and Robert 1984). Bagwell and Shoven (1988),
Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001), Lie (2002) as well as Hovakimian (2004) find
that the probability of stock repurchase is positively related to leverage deficit, that is,
before repurchase companies tend to have debt ratios that are lower than the target level,
and managements utilize stock repurchases to bring the capital structures to more optimal
levels. Particularly, announcement period returns are higher when stock buybacks are
financed with debt (Masulis 1980, Vermaelen 1981) in that debt-financed repurchases
can raise debt ratio even more than cash repurchases.
2.4 Earning Per Share
The fourth motivation for stock repurchase, widely circulated among practitioners, is
associated with earning per share. Since corporate executives' remunerations and
promotions are linked to some kind of earning measures, it is not uncommon for
managers to engage in earning misrepresentation (Schrand and Walther 2000).
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Numerous articles2 in business magazines and newspapers have claimed that repurchase
can reduce outstanding shares and thus push up earning per share even when profits
remain unchanged. If profits do rise, earning per share can increase even more. For
example, as a result of grand stock buybacks, Dell and Cisco's earning per share grew
18% and 19% in the fourth quarter of 2005, while their net income merely grew 12% and
8% respectively (Henry 2006). As another example, more than 16 percent of
ExxonMobil's earning per share growth over four-year period from 2002 to 2006 is
attributed to share repurchase rather than performance improvement (Oded and Michel
2008). Also in 2008 fiscal year, Darden Restaurants reported an earning per share of
$2.69 after buying back five million shares. Reimers and Singleton (2010) pointed out
that the earning per share would have been $2.59, a 10-cents decease, if there had been
no share repurchase. Three-fourths of the 384 financial executives surveyed by Brav,
Graham, Harvey and Michaely (2005) admit that "increasing earning per share is an
important factor affecting their share repurchase decisions". Research reveals that
corporate executives manage diluted earning per share. Stock repurchase activities
increase when outstanding employee stock options can potentially dilute earning per
share, or when earnings fall short of the past earning per share growth rate (Bens, Nagar,
Skinner and Wong 2003). Ghosh, Harding, Sezer and Sirmans (2008) as well as Hurtt,
Kreuze and Langsam (2008) already discovered positive relationship between executive
2 See Koretz and Mehring (2004), Dobbs and Rehm (2005), Goddard (2005), Rosenberg (2005), Siegel
(2006), Smith (2006), Brandstrader (2007), Silverblatt and Guarino (2007).
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stock option holdings and the likelihood of repurchase announcement in REIT industry
and IT industry, respectively.
The four motives covered in this paper are neither mutually exclusive nor all-
encompassing. Most of the time companies conduct share buyback for more than one
purpose (Guffey and Schneider 2004, Bozanic 2010). For example, Guffey and
Schneider (2004) reveal that variables associated with free cash flow hypothesis remain
as the most important explanations for stock repurchases, but leverage and tax hypothesis
also adds some additional explanatory power. Dittmar (2000) has pointed out that the
rationales behind stock buyback change with circumstances over time. Companies utilize
repurchases to take advantage of potential undervaluation throughout the sample period
from 1977 to 1996, and to distribute excess capital and raise leverage ratio in many
subperiods. Companies also repurchase stock to fend off takeovers and counter the
dilution effects of stock options in limited subperiods, which coincided with an active
takeover market in mid 1980s and the increasing usage of management stock options
from late 1980s and early 1990s.
2.5 Hypothesis Development
It is surprising to know that a lot of repurchases are announced, but not executed.
Traders estimate that only one third of all the announcements in a given year actually get
completed (Power 1995). A study by Stephens and Weisbach (1998) documents that
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from 1981 to 1990 companies on average acquired 74 to 82 percent of the shares
announced as repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcements.
But why companies announce repurchase programs, but not implement it? If companies
don't plan to buy back their own shares, why they make announcements in the first
According to undervaluation signaling hypothesis, companies repurchase stocks to (1)
profit from buying low and selling high, and (2) send out information to public that their
stocks are underpriced. If companies do want to make money from the transactions, they
should not announce at all. Researches reveal that repurchase announcements usually
trigger price rally and it will make no economic sense for the companies to buy stocks
after the prices are bidding up. Even after the adoption of SEC Rule 1 Ob-1 8 Safe Harbor
for Issuer Repurchases in 1982, companies are allowed to buy back their stocks without
announcement beforehand. Therefore, it is more reasonable for companies to purchase
their undervalued stocks behind others' back and reissue them when the prices are high.
For the latter, if companies only intent to pass on the insider information to the public,
announcement already serves as a "news bulletin" and it is not necessary to signal again
with actual repurchase, thus incurring little or no cost on the companies' part to covey the
information.
As for the other three motives, companies have to buy back stocks to distribute cash to
shareholders and lower their cash level, have to buy back stocks to shrink equity
composition and raise leverage ratio, and have to buy back stocks to reduce outstanding
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shares and raise earning per share. Announcements without action will not achieve their
purposes.
In summary, the hypotheses to be tested in this research are:
Hl: Companies which make repurchase announcements but do not actually
repurchase stocks tend to use announcements to signal undervaluation.
H2: Companies which make repurchase announcements and actually complete the
program tend to use repurchase to reducefree cashflow, to increase leverage ratio or
to improve earning per share.
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3.0 MOTIVATIONS BEHIND REPURCHASERS & NON-REPURCHASERS
In this section, I will test the aforementioned two hypotheses relating to the different
motives of Repurchasers (i.e. companies that complete the repurchase program as
announced) and Non-Repurchasers (i.e. companies that announce stock repurchase but do
not actually buy back any share).
3.1 Announced Repurchase
I examined all repurchase announcements from Year 2000 to 2009 made by companies
listed in either New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) or National Association of Securities
Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ). These announcements are retrieved
from Thomson ONE Banker Mergers & Acquisitions Database.
Neither SEC nor stock exchanges require announcing companies to disclose number of
shares or dollar amount of shares to be repurchased, so some companies disclose both,
but many only disclose one (Fried 2005). Thomson ONE Banker Mergers &
Acquisitions Database does not provide number of target shares directly, but does have
information on Value of Transaction, Price per Share and Target Share Price 1 Day Prior
17
to Announcement. So, to calculate the Number ofAnnounced Repurchase Share, I divide
Value of Transaction by Price per Share or Target Share Price 1 Day Prior to
Announcement, ifPrice per Share is not available.
Some companies buy back stocks on a regular basis. To avoid contamination from other
repurchase program and double-counting of shares purchased under different programs, I
exclude announcements which are followed by another repurchase announcement in the
same quarter or one quarter after.
3.2 Actual Repurchase
Number of shares actually bought following announcements is not reported directly by
listed companies and has to be derived indirectly from Bloomberg's Decrease in Capital
Stocks3 which refers to repurchase of common stock, common stock warrants, or other
common stock equivalents, including redemption ofpreferred share capital.
To get the Number of Actual Repurchased Share, first I subtract reduction in Preferred
Stock4 from Decrease in Capital Stocks to get the dollar amount spent for common stock
repurchase. And I then divide it by quarterly closing price for an estimated number of
common shares repurchased in each quarter.
3 Bloomberg code for "Decrease in Capital Stocks" is CF03 1 - CFDECRCAP STOCK
4 Bloomberg code for "Preferred Equity" is BS061 - BS_PFD_EQY
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3.3 Repurchaser vs. Non-Repurchaser
In this paper I include the actual shares repurchased in the announcement quarter as well
as actual shares repurchased in the following quarter, and compare it with the announced
repurchase target to determine my Repurchaser and Non-Repurchaser. More specifically,
REPO% t = ShareActual t+i / ShareAnnounce t
Where ShareActual t+i = (CapitalDecrease t - PreferDecrease t) / Pt +
(CapitalDecrease t+i - PreferDecrease t+i) / Pt+i
ShareAnnounce t = TransactionValue t / P't
Pt, Pt+i = Price at the end ofquarter t and t+1
P't = Price in the announcement or price 1 day before announcement
By the end of quarter t+1, Repurchaser must buy back at least the target number of shares
announced in quarter t, or REPO% t > 1 · On the other hand, Non-Repurchaser does not
buy back a single share by the end ofquarter t+1, or REPO% t = 0.
3.4 Methodology
Following other studies (Kahle 2002, Lee and Alam 2004, Skinner 2008) I will also adopt
Logit regression with cross-sectional data to investigate the motives behind Repurchaser
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and Non-Repurchaser. What make companies complete repurchase program as
announced and what make them fail to buy back any share?
Logit model can be used to analyze the determinants of qualitative response variables. In
this research I run the Logit regression to predict the probability that the company will
become Repurchaser or Non-Repurchaser as a function of some independent variables.
Specifically, the Logit regressions I will use for hypothesis testing are shown below,
REPOt = b0+b1LOGATt.i (1)
REPO, = bo +O2Rt-I (2)
REPO t = bo + b3MKBK_IND t-i (3)
REPO t = bo + biLOGAT tA + b2R t-i + b3MKBK_IND M (4)
REPO t = bo + b4FCF_AT t_, (5)
REPO t = bo + O5DEBT-AT m (6)
REPO t = bo + b6DEPS_Chg M (7)
REPO t = bo + biLOGAT t-i + b2R t-i + b3MKBK_IND ?
+ b4FCF_AT t_i + b5DEBT_AT M + b6DEPS_Chg t., (8)
REPO is the discrete dependent variable to represent different groups of companies. If it
is Non-Repurchaser, REPO equals O and if it is Repurchaser, it equals 1. In Equation (1)
20
LOGAT is the natural log of total assets before repurchase announcement. R in Equation
(2) gives the quarterly return immediately before announcement quarter. In Equation (3)
MKBKIND equals market-to-book ratio prior to repurchase announcement divided by
the industry average market-to-book ratio in the sample. LOGAT, R and MKBKIND
are associated with undervaluation, so Equation (1) to (3) are used to test my first
hypothesis that undervalued companies will fail to buy back their stocks after repurchase
announcement. Equation (4) is a multivariate Logit regression to include all three
independent variables of LOGAT, R and MKBKIND to jointly test the undervaluation
signaling hypothesis. Equation (5) to (7) as shown above are related to my second
hypothesis that companies are more likely to complete repurchase program if they buy
back their own stocks to reduce free cash flow, to increase leverage ratio or to improve
earning per share. Equation (5) covers free cash flow motive. FCF_AT in Equation (5)
is free cash flow scaled by total assets in the quarter preceding announcement. Equation
(6) is for financial leverage motive. DEBT_AT represents leverage ratio, equaling total
debt divided by the sum of total debt and market value of common equity. Earning per
share motive will be examined in Equation (7) where DEPSChg is the change in diluted
earning per share in the last quarter before repurchase announcement. Both of my
hypotheses will be tested simultaneously in Equation (8), so it combines all six
independent variables mentioned above in the regression. All of the independent
variables can be extracted from Bloomberg.
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3.5 Descriptive Statistics
The sample includes 737 observations with all the necessary dependent and independent
variables. It stretches ten years from 2000 to 2009. As presented in Figure 1, the number
of observations keeps increasing from 27 (i.e. 13 Non-Repurchasers and 14
Repurchasers) in Year 2000 to 145 (i.e. 57 Non-Repurchasers and 88 Repurchasers) in
Year 2008. There is a sharp decrease in 2009, which is mainly due to lack of actual
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Figure 1 Non-Repurchaser & Repurchaser Distribution by Year
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According to Table 1, among the 737 observations, 253 are the so called Non-
Repurchasers, which didn't buy back any share in the announcement quarter or the
following quarter. The rest 484 observations are grouped under Repurchaser. These
companies complete the repurchase program within one to two quarters after
announcement. In contrast to Non-Repurchasers which incur little cost, Repurchasers'
abilities to buy back stocks largely depend on general market conditions and their own
operational performances, thus they are more vulnerable to changes in business cycle.
The number of Repurchasers peaked in 2007, just before the financial crisis erupted, to
reach 126, or 26% of all Repurchasers in the sample. Then it dropped dramatically in the
following years when most companies are tight with cash to carry out the stock buyback.
The number of Non-Repurchasers is relatively more stable throughout the years. But it
more than doubled in 2008 to 57 or 23% of all Non-Repurchasers in the sample, when the
market experienced the most severe shock of the past few decades. This phenomenon
supports my first hypothesis that Non-Repurchasers are more likely to signal
undervaluation through repurchase announcements.
< Insert Table 1 here >
Table 2 Panel A and Panel B present the sample distribution by Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) code. One-third of the observations are under Manufacturing sector,
followed by Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate sector as well as Services sector, both
accounting for 20% of the total sample. The composition of Non-Repurchaser and
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Repurchaser looks similar across the sectors and across the sample. No sector portrays
itself as a typical Non-Repurchaser or as a typical Repurchaser.
< Insert Table 2 here >
Next I take a closer look at both Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser, trying to identify
their different traits. Table 3 lists a comparison of key variables between these two
groups of companies. LOGAT represents the natural log of total assets. Non-
Repurchaser' s LOGAT is smaller than that of Repurchaser in terms of both mean and
median, so Non-Repurchaser is small firm relative to Repurchaser. R is the quarterly
return. The mean and median quarterly returns for Non-Repurchaser are -2.56% and
-3.44%, and for Repurchaser are 1.26% and 0.15%. Non-Repurchaser' s stock price
declines in the quarter before repurchase announcement, so it is likely that Non-
Repurchaser is undervalued. But Repurchaser's stock price rises before repurchase
announcement, thus it is less likely that Repurchaser is undervalued by the market. The
management issues repurchase announcement probably for reasons other than signaling
undervaluation. On the whole, Repurchaser's market-to-book ratio (MKBK) is higher
than that of Non-Repurchaser. This is especially true for the mean. On average, Non-
Repurchaser's market-to-book ratio stands at 2.36 while Repurchaser's market-to-book
ratio hovers at 8.66. When company's market-to-book ratio is scaled by its
corresponding Industry's (as defined in Table 2 Panel B) ratio, Non-Repurchaser' s
market-to-book ratio, on average, is lower than the Industry's market-to-book ratio, about
63% of the Industry level. However, Repurchaser possesses a market-to-book ratio that
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is 19% higher than the Industry average number. Once again, the market-to-book ratio
indicates that Non-Repurchaser is more likely to be undervalued than Repurchaser.
Repurchaser controls more free cash flow (FCF), more than double of the Non-
Repurchaser' s level. FCFAT equals FCF divided by total assets. As shown in Table 3,
Repurchaser still has higher FCFAT, though its total assets are relatively larger than its
counterpart. On average, free cash flow accounts for 1.96% of Repurchaser's total assets
and Non-Repurchaser' s free cash flow is about 1.29% of its assets. The difference is
around 0.67%. The result from median FCF_AT is about same, with Non-Repurchaser' s
being 1.04%, Repurchaser's being 1.56% and difference being 0.52%. The variable
DEBT tells a mixed story. Non-Repurchaser has a higher mean DEBT while
Repurchaser has a higher median DEBT. DEBTAT measures leverage ratio. It equals
total debt (DEBT) divided by sum of total debt and market value of equity.
Repurchaser's debt ratios are 18.69% (mean) and 11.36% (median), 2.83% and 4.12%
lower than those of Non- Repurchaser. DEPS is the quarterly diluted earning per share.
Repurchaser's diluted earning per share is higher than Non-Repurchaser' s earning per
share in terms of both mean and median. DEPSChg measures the change in quarterly
DEPS prior to repurchase announcement. Though Repurchaser has higher diluted
earning per share, but it was decreasing in the short term. The mean DEPS_Chg for
Repurchaser is -0.10. In contrast, Non-Repurchaser' s diluted earning per share is
improving in the quarter before the announcement, though it is still not as good as
Repurchaser's diluted earning per share figure. The mean DEPSChg for Non-
Repurchaser is 0.27, which 0.37 higher than that of Repurchaser. From the above
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statistics, it is easy to see Repurchaser has more free cash flow, lower debt ratio and
deteriorating earning per share. Therefore, it is more likely that Repurchaser would want
to buy back their stocks so as to distribute excess cash, raise financial leverage and
improve earning per share than Non-Repurchaser.
< Insert Table 3 here >
3.6 Logit Regression
To shed light on the relationship between motives and actual repurchase activities
subsequent to announcement, I estimate the Logit regressions of Equation (1) to (8)
presented in Methodology chapter.
If it is Non-Repurchaser, the dependent variable REPO is set to O; if Repurchaser, REPO
is equal to 1. In my first hypothesis, I propose that undervalued companies are more
likely to use repurchase announcement to signal undervaluation and actual repurchase is
not necessary since insider information is already sent out through announcement.
According to Vermaelen (1981), small firms are less likely to be covered by analysts and
media, so information asymmetry and undervaluation will be more pronounced in small
firms than in large firms. If this rationale is valid, small firms are more likely to be the
Non-Repurchaser. bi in Equation (1), (4) and (8), i.e. the coefficient for independent
variable LOGAT, is expected to be negative. Likewise, b2 in Equation (2), (4) and (8),
the coefficient for independent variable R, should also be negative since firms are more
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likely to signal undervaluation if their share prices are plunging. MKBK_IND is equal to
company's market-to-book ratio divided by its corresponding industry's average market-
to-book ratio. Some industries have high market-to-book ratio while others have low
market-to-book ratio, thus the ratio per se does not indicate companies in low market-to-
book industry are undervalued or companies in high market-to-book industry are not
undervalued. However, if the company's market-to-book ratio is lower than its industry
average, it is very likely that its stock is undervalued by the market. By comparing
company's market-to-book ratio with the industry average in the sample, I try to clean up
the impact from industry disparity. When MKBKIND is small or less than 1, it is more
likely that the company is undervalued. Therefore, b3 in Equation (3), (4) and (8) is
expected to be negative.
The other three independent variables, i.e. FCFAT, DEBTAT and DEPSChg are
associated with my second hypothesis which states that companies are more likely to buy
back their own stocks after repurchase announcement to distribute free cash flow, raise
leverage ratio and boost earnings per share. If companies have excess cash flow, they are
more likely to send out the money through actual repurchase, so b4 in Equation (5) and
(8), the coefficient for FCF_AT, should be negative. Only when DEBT_AT is low will
companies want to reduce equity through stock repurchase, so bs in Equation (6) and (8),
is expected to be of positive sign. DEPSChg is the change in diluted earning per share
before announcement. It is very likely that when earning per share deteriorates
management will want to buy back stocks, reduce number of shares outstanding, and
quickly raise earning per share so as to maintain it at historical level or to meet market
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expectation. Therefore, be in Equation (7) and (8), the coefficient for DEPS_Chg is
expected to be positive in this case.
Table 4 shows the Logit regression results. Overall market condition can trigger
companies to conduct repurchases around same time. For example, as indicated
previously in Table 1, 23% of all Non-Repurchasers in the sample occur in 2008 and 26%
of all Repurchasers in the sample occur in 2007. As a result, the standard error of the
observations in my sample may be correlated, which will bias the test statistics and
misrepresent the significance level. So in Table 4, besides the normal statistical results, I
also show the test results after adjusting for cluster by year in column "adj. ?2". The
major findings from the Logit regression are as follows.
In Table 4 the coefficient for LOGAT in Equation (1) is -0.31, which is significant at 1%
level. It provides strong support that small firms, vulnerable to information asymmetry
and undervaluation, are more likely to be the Non-Repurchaser. The coefficient for R in
Equation (2) is also negative, significant at 10% level for normal ?2 and significant at 5%
level for adjusted ?2. It means that stock price decline is often followed by repurchase
announcement, but not actual repurchase. The coefficient for MKBK_IND in Equation
(3) is negative as expected and significant at 5% level. So, when company's market-to-
book ratio is low relative to Industry average, there will be more chance that it will be
Non-Repurchaser after making the announcement. LOGAT, R and MKBKIND are
proxies for undervaluation to test my first hypothesis, so in Equation (4) I include all
three of them as the independent variables. Just as in univariate regression, LOGAT, R
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and MKBK_IND still have negative coefficients and significant at 1% or 5% level. Thus,
results from Equation (1) to Equation (4) all support my first hypothesis that "companies
which make repurchase announcements but do not actually repurchase stocks tend to use
announcements to signal undervaluation".
The negative coefficient for FCF_AT in Equation (5), which is significant at 10% level,
implies that cash rich companies are more likely to complete the repurchase program as
announced. The coefficient for DEBTAT in Equation (6) is 0.58, significant at 10%
level for normal ?2 and insignificant for adjusted ?2. This result provides mild support
that low leveraged companies are more likely to repurchase stocks so as to decrease
equity level and benefit from more leverage. DEPSChg in Equation (7) has positive
marginal effect in the regression and is significant at 1% level. If a company's diluted
earning per share increases, it is more likely that it will not buy back its stocks. However,
if the diluted earning per share is in a downward trend, company tends to repurchase its
own stocks to reduce the number of shares outstanding and boost the earning per share
instantly. So far, the univariate Logit regressions on FCFAT, DEBTAT and
DEPS_Chg all support my second hypothesis that "companies which make repurchase
announcements and actually complete the program tend to use repurchase to reduce free
cash flow, to increase leverage ratio or to improve earning per share".
Finally in Equation (8) I include all variables in the multivariate Logit regression to test
both hypotheses simultaneously. As shown in Table 4, all coefficients are of expected
signs, among which LOGAT and DEPS_Chg are significant at 1% level, R, MKBKIND
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and DEBTAT at 5% level, and FCFAT at 10% level. I also look at the coefficient
correlations among all these variables in Table 5 to check whether there exists any
multicollinearity. All variables in the regression are not highly correlated, thus
multicollinearity should not be a concern here.
< Insert Table 4 here >
< Insert Table 5 here >
Similar to Logit regression, Probit regression also models the marginal effect of
independent variables on the likelihood of the qualitative dependent variables. However,
Logit model assumes a logic error term while Probit model assumes a normally
distributed error term. Thus, I also tried univariate and multivariate Probit regressions to
test my hypotheses. As shown in Table 6, the results are almost same as those from Logit
regression: all coefficients are of the same sign and mostly at the same significance level
as those in Table 4. Also there is no high correlation among the variables in the Probit
regression in Table 7.
< Insert Table 6 here >
< Insert Table 7 here >
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3.7 Summary
In this section I investigated the characteristics and motives of Non-Repurchaser and
Repurchaser via descriptive statistics and Logit regression.
Non-Repurchasers appear to be small undervalued firms. Right before the repurchase
announcement, although they have achieved evident improvement in terms of diluted
earning per share, their stock prices still keep dropping. It is quite possible that small
firms are not tracked closely, thus even though their operation is improving, it is not
noticed by the market and not captured in the share price. To make things even worse,
the decline in share prices still keeps its momentum. Under such circumstances, these
companies are very likely to utilize repurchase announcement to demonstrate that they
are pretty much undervalued. The subsequent actual buyback is not necessary in this
case since companies already send out the signal through announcement.
Repurchasers seem to be big, cash-rich and low-leveraged companies with worsening
diluted earning per share and higher market-to-book ratio than the Industry. These
companies buy back their own stocks to distribute excess cash or to increase leverage
ratio. Though Repurchasers' diluted earning per share is still higher than that of Non-
Repurchasers, it is actually shifting downwards in the near term. In contrast to
decreasing earning per share, these companies' stock prices keep going up. Thus, in
order to sustain the historical performance and meet market expectation, Repurchasers
will tend to buy back their own stocks to boost earning per share.
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4.0 MARKET REACTION TO REPURCHASER & NON-REPURCHASER
Previous studies detected favorable market reactions around stock repurchase
announcements (Dann 1981, Vermaele 1981, Comment and Jarrell 1991, Grullon and
Michaely 2002, Webb 2008), but unfortunately none of them digs further to investigate
this issue based on the execution after announcements. To fill in this gap I devote this
section to the different market reactions to Non-Repurchaser & Repurchaser.
4.1 Methodology & Data
I will calculate Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) to gauge the excess return linked to
repurchase announcements from Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser. The announcement
date is set as Day 0. The estimation period ranges from Day -250 to Day -10, and the
event period covers around one year from Day 0 to Day 250.
Three-factor Asset Pricing Model (Fama and French 1996) is employed to estimate the
expected return:
Rlt - RFt = % + m¡ (RMt - RF1) + s¡ SMB1 + h¡ HML1
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In above equation, R¡t - RFt is the daily return on company i in excess of the risk-free rate
(the one-month Treasury bill rate) for day t. RM1- RFt is the excess return for day t on a
value-weighted market portfolio of all NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ stocks from Center
for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). The Fama-French factors are constructed using
the six value-weight portfolios formed on size and book-to-market. SMBt (Small Minus
Big) is the day t average return on the three small portfolios minus the average return on
the three big portfolios. HMLt (High Minus Low) is the day t average return on the two
value portfolios minus the average return on the two growth portfolios. RMt- RFt, SMBt
and HMLt are used to measure the impact of market, size and book-to-market factors on
returns.
Daily Abnormal Return (AR) is the difference between actual return and the return
predicted from the Three-Factor Model, that is
ARit = Rit - E(R1O = Rit - [ai + RF1 + m¡ (RMt - RF1) + s¡ SMB1 + h¡ HML1]
Rit is the actual return on day t for company i, E(R¡t) represents the expected return. To
investigate the announcement effect on different groups of companies, the average AR on
Day t for all observations in the sample AR_Allt, for Non-Repurchaser ARNon-





AR_Non-Repurchasert = S ARjt / Nj
j = i
ARRepurchasert = S ARkt / Nk
k = l
33
Ni , Nj and Nk represent the number of all observations, the number of Non-Repurchaser
and the number ofRepurchaser, respectively, and N¡ = Nj + Nk.
Abnormal Returns are then accumulated to form Cumulative Abnormal Return, providing





Daily Fama-French factor data, i.e. RM - RF, SMB, HML and RF, are downloaded from
Kenneth R. French's website5. Companies' stock price information from Day -251 to
Day 250 is obtained from Bloomberg to calculate stock returns. In the sample examined
in previous section for my hypothesis testing, 697 of the 737 observations have all the
price data available, so I will use these 697 announcements as my sample to test market
reaction. Among the 697 observations, 232 belong to Non-Repurchaser and 465 belong
to Repurchaser.
5 Kenneth R. French's data library webpage:
http'y/mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/kenfrench/data_library.htrnl
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4.2 Stock Return after Repurchase Announcement
The quarterly returns, before repurchase announcement, are -2.56% for Non-Repurchaser
and 1.26% for Repurchaser, then what happens to the stock price after the
announcement?
Table 8 lists the daily return from repurchase announcement date (Day 0) to 60 days after
the announcement date (Day 60). As normal, the most pronounced price appreciation
occurs on Day 0 and Day 1. The 697 announcements in the sample, on average, have
positive return of 0.92% on Day 0 and 0.85% on Day 1. Non-Repurchaser's price
appreciation is much more than that of Repurchaser. More specifically, Non-
Repurchaser's share price increases 1.29% and 1.41% on Day 0 and Day 1, while the
price appreciation is only 0.73% and 0.57% for Repurchaser for the same two days. Non-
Repurchaser has positive daily return in 49 days out of the 61 days from Day 0 to Day 60,
and Repurchaser only has 27 days with price increase. So the positive stock return is
only persistent with Non-Repurchaser throughout the first 61 days since announcement.
For Repurchaser, the most positive returns only occur for the first few days after
repurchase program is announced and then share prices actually drop in most of the 61-
day period.
< Insert Table 8 here >
The different trends between Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser are apparent in Figure 2,
which shows the cumulative return from Day 0 to Day 60. Non-Repurchaser's share
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price keeps rising for one quarter after the announcement. However, Repurchaser starts
with slightly positive return, and then drifts downwards into the negative territory. In the
first 61 days, the two groups' stocks head for different directions and the difference in
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Figure 2 Cumulative Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 60
Table 9 presents cumulative stock return from Day 0 to Day 60 for all announcements in
the sample, for Non-Repurchaser and for Repurchaser. On average the sample in
question achieves 2.16% quarterly return since repurchase announcement. But if we
investigate further, only Non-Repurchaser maintains positive cumulative return of
10.25% on Day 60. Repurchaser's cumulative return on Day 60 is actually -1.88%. In
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other words, Non-Repurchasers' stocks outperform Repurchasers' by 12.13% in the 60
days after announcement. Repurchaser starts with positive cumulative return like Non-
Repurchaser, but the cumulative return turns negative from Day 24 and remains more
negative in subsequent days. This contrasts sharply with the stock performance before
repurchase announcement when Non-Repurchaser experiences decline in price and
Repurchaser enjoys stock price appreciation.
< Insert Table 9 here >
In previous paragraph I examined the quarterly return up to 60 days after repurchase
announcement. Now I would like to check out the yearly return up to 250 days after the
announcement. First, Figure 3 draws the cumulative return trends of both Non-
Repurchaser and Repurchaser for the period of Day 0 to Day 250. Non-Repurchaser' s
share price keeps climbing up only till around Day 70, then it slowly drifts downwards.
Repurchaser's stock keeps declining until Day 150, then bounces back a little bit
thereafter. From the figure, it seems the divergence between Non-Repurchaser and
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Figure 3 Cumulative Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 250
Table 10 Cumulative Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 250 fiirnishes more details on
this phenomenon. On Day 250, about one year after the repurchase announcement is
made, the whole sample, the Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser obtain a yearly return of
-0.02%, 7.74% and -3.89%. The difference between Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser
is about 1 1.63%. For Non-Repurchaser, the turning point occurs around Day 70, when its
cumulative stock return peaks at 10.31% and difference with Repurchaser stands at
12.53%. Therefore, the 11.63% difference in returns on Day 250 is actually acquired
within the first 70 days after announcement. The cumulative stock returns from Day 70






response to Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser only exists about one quarter since the
announcement. After that, the market views the two groups pretty much the same.
< Insert Table 10 here >
4.3 Abnormal Return from Repurchase Announcement
In the previous chapter, it is detected that Non-Repurchaser receives higher stock returns
after announcement than Repurchaser does. However, it is possible that Non-
Repurchaser' s share premium may not result from repurchase event. As indicated by
Fama and French (1993), the premium may be due to more favorable market condition
when Non-Repurchaser announces the buyback program, or may be due to Non-
Repurchaser's small size and high book-to-market. To remove all these noises, I further
investigate the Abnormal Return (AR) and Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR)
associated with repurchase announcement.
First I ran the Fama-French Three-Factor Asset Pricing regression based on return
information from Day -250 to Day -10 to estimate for all 697 announcements the
parameters in the Three-Factor Asset Pricing Model, from which I calculated expected
return from Day 0 to Day 250. The difference between actual and expected return is the
so-called Abnormal Return. Table 1 1 only lists the average Abnormal Returns for the
whole sample, for Non-Repurchaser and for Repurchaser from Day 0 to Day 60.
Consistent with result from daily stock return, the most significant Abnormal Returns
39
occur on the first two days. On announcement day (Day 0) the whole sample, Non-
Repurchaser and Repurchaser have positive Abnormal Return of 1.08%, 1.49% and
0.87%, respectively. And on Day 1 they gain 0.91%, 1.51% and 0.60%, respectively.
Obviously, Non-Repurchaser experiences larger Abnormal Return than Repurchaser
does. This is consistent with my hypothesis that Non-Repurchaser is more likely to be
undervalued, so after repurchase program is announced, market spots the undervaluation
and corrects the mistake. In the 61 days from Day 0 to Day 60, Non-Repurchaser and
Repurchaser have 56 and 50 days with positive Abnormal Returns, compared with 47 and
26 days of positive stock returns for the two groups. Thus, it can be inferred that
Repurchaser's negative stock returns during event period are mainly due to the
unfavorable market condition when Repurchaser makes announcement, its big size or its
low book-to-market. After removing the influences of all these factors, Repurchaser's
stocks also benefit from the repurchase event, though not as significant as Non-
Repurchaser.
< Insert Table 1 1 here >
Next I examine the corresponding Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR), which is the
sum of all Abnormal Returns from Day 0 to Day 60. The major trends of the Cumulative
Abnormal Returns can be seen in Figure 4. The upward trend of Cumulative Abnormal
Return for Non-Repurchaser is very similar to its upward trend of cumulative stock return
in Figure 2. But for Repurchaser, in contrast to a downward cumulative stock return, its
Cumulative Abnormal Return is also climbing up throughout the 61 days, though not as
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steep as Non-Repurchaser. Thus, the difference in Cumulative Abnormal Returns during
this period is increasing with the time.
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Figure 4 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) from Day 0 to Day 60
The most significant single day Abnormal Return happens on Day 0 and Day 1.
Accordingly, the Cumulative Abnormal Returns in Table 12 on Day 1 are 1.99%, 3.01%
and 1.48% for the whole sample, for Non-Repurchaser and for Repurchaser. This result
is in line with other findings on short-term Abnormal Return around repurchase
announcement (Dann 1981, Vermaele 1981, Comment and Jarrell 1991, Grullon and
Michaely 2002). The Cumulative Abnormal Returns keep rising throughout the event
period. By the end of Day 60, Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the whole sample, for
Non-Repurchaser and for Repurchaser reach 12.15%, 20.88% and 7.79%. In terms of
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Cumulative Abnormal Returns, Non-Repurchaser still outperforms Repurchaser by
13.09%, about same magnitude as the difference of 12.13% in cumulative stock return.
< Insert Table 12 here >
Next, I will also explore the longer-term Cumulative Abnormal Returns. Figure 5
presents the Day 0 to Day 250 Cumulative Abnormal Return trends for Non-Repurchaser
and Repurchaser. The gap between the two groups keeps enlarging at the beginning, then
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Figure 5 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) from Day 0 to Day 250
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As shown by Table 13, on Day 250 the Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the whole
sample, for Non-Repurchaser and for Repurchaser are as high as 74.28%, 85.48% and
68.69%. Non-Repurchaser outperforms Repurchaser by 16.79%. The "Difference"
column in Table 13 indicates that the gap is increasing until Day 160 to 19.06%, and then
it slightly shrinks in the rest of the days. The 16.79% difference on Day 250 was
acquired in the first 120 days after announcements, indicating that market treats Non-
Repurchaser more favorably only for the two quarters immediately following the
announcement. After that, Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser perform equally well.
< Insert Table 13 here >
4.4 Summary
This section focuses on the different market responses to repurchase announcements
made by Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser. First, Non-Repurchaser is subject to more
favorable market reaction than Repurchaser. Non-Repurchaser outperforms Repurchaser
by 11% to 17% with respect to stock return or Abnormal Return. This result provides
further support to my first hypothesis that Non-Repurchasers are more likely to be
undervalued. The extra price appreciation experienced by Non-Repurchaser is the result
of market's self-correction triggered by repurchase announcement. Second, though the
most significant single day positive Abnormal Return occurs in two days covering
announcement day and one day after, both Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser still
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receive slightly positive Abnormal Returns from Day 2 up until Day 250, or about one
year after repurchase announcement. Third, it appears that market's preference to Non-
Repurchaser only lasts for one to two quarters after repurchase announcement. Beyond
that point, it doesn't differentiate between these two groups ofcompanies.
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5.0 CONCLUSION
The 1982 US SEC Rule 10b- 18 Safe Harbor for Issuer Repurchases sets up the guidelines
regarding manner, timing, price and volume of repurchase. Repurchase companies will
not be liable for price manipulation if they follow these guidelines to buy back their own
stocks. Since then more companies utilize stock repurchase to achieve their purposes.
The dollar amount of repurchases by S&P 500 companies skyrocketed to nearly $600
billion in 2007 from merely $30 billion in the 1980s.
So far researches have shown that the most common reasons for companies to buy back
their own stocks include: 1) send out insider information to signal undervaluation to the
market; 2) distribute excess cash to investors; 3) decrease equity composition and thus
raise leverage ratio; 4) reduce number of shares outstanding to increase earning per share.
When investigating these motivations, extant papers either look at repurchase
announcements alone or actual repurchase activities and didn't try to view this issue on
the basis of execution of the repurchase announcement. The execution is becoming an
issue because "firms on average acquire 74 to 82 percent of the shares announced as
repurchase targets within three years of the repurchase announcement" (Stephens and
Weisbach 1998) and some companies didn't even buy back any share after announcing
the repurchase programs.
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My research differs from others in that I relate repurchase announcement with subsequent
actual repurchase activity. In comparison of the actual number of stock repurchased with
the announced target number of stocks to be repurchased, I group the companies into
Non-Repurchaser, which doesn't buy back any stock after announcement, and
Repurchaser, which completes the repurchase program as announced.
I find that prior to buyback announcements, Repurchasers are big companies, with
worsening diluted earning per share but slightly positive stock returns and higher than
Industry market-to-book ratio. This kind of companies is not likely to be undervalued by
the market. Instead, they are more likely to reduce outstanding shares to boost earning
per share so that they can maintain historical performance and keep up with the market
expectation. Compared with its counterparties, Repurchasers tend to have more free cash
flow and lower debt ratio before repurchases are announced, so it is also possible that this
kind of companies carry out the repurchase in order to distribute cash flow to
shareholders, or to benefit from more leverage. My Logit regression results also show
that higher level of free cash flow, lower level of debt ratio and lower level of change in
earning per share can enhance the likelihood that such companies being Repurchaser.
Non-Repurchasers tend to be small companies, with improving performance but
declining share prices and lower than Industry market-to-book ratio. This kind of
companies is more likely to be undervalued. Therefore, they tend to take advantage of
repurchase announcement to attract market attention so as to re-appraise their stock prices
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to reflect their true values. Since their only purpose is to send out signal to the outsider,
actual repurchase is not necessary as repurchase announcement has already done the job.
In addition, I also examined the market reaction to repurchase announcements.
Consistent with existing literature, my sample also shows positive stock returns and
positive Abnormal Returns around announcement date. After I separate the Non-
Repurchaser and Repurchaser in my sample, it is very obvious that the former experience
much more favorable market responses, although it only exists for one to two quarters
after announcement. These findings also furnish evidences from another perspective that
Non-Repurchasers are undervalued companies.
My research is just an initial attempt to answer the questions why some companies
announce repurchase programs but do not actually buy back any of their stocks and why
some companies want to repurchase their own stocks after announcement. More works
are required to solve these issues thoroughly. For example, in this paper I use Decrease
in Capital Stocks, Preferred Stock and Quarterly Closing Price to obtain an estimation of
the actual number of shares being repurchased. Lack confidence in the accuracy of the
REPO%, I just group my sample into Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser based on
whether REPO% is equal to 0 or not less than 1 , and run Logit regression for hypothesis
testing. If more accurate information on actual repurchase is obtainable, future research
should run the regression with REPO% as dependent variable and investigate the
numerical relationship between REPO% and all the explanatory variables. Another area
worth exploring is the companies in between (0 < REPO% < 1) that partially complete
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the repurchase program. It will be interesting to see whether these companies appear
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Table 1 Sample Distribution by Year
The sample consists of 737 repurchase announcements from 2000 to 2009, issued by companies
listed in NYSE or NASDAQ. It is grouped into Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser based on
actual purchase of stock relative to announced target of repurchase. Non-Repurchaser does not
buy back any share within one to two quarters after repurchase announcement while Repurchaser
completes the repurchase program and buys back at least the announced number of shares.
Year N % Non-Repurchaser % Repurchaser %
2000 27 4% 13 5% 14 3%
2001 44 6% 27 11% 17 4%
2002 41 6% 11 4% 30 6%
2003 47 6% 16 6% 31 6%
2004 75 10% 27 11% 48 10%
2005 83 11% 27 11% 56 12%
2006 79 11% 23 9% 56 12%
2007 150 20% 24 9% 126 26%
2008 145 20% 57 23% 88 18%
2009 46 6% 28 11% 18 4%
Total 737 100% 253 100% 484 100%
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Table 2 Sample Distribution by Industry
Panel A presents sample distribution based on two-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC)
code.
Industry Industry
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 3
08 - - Forestry 3
Mining IS
12 - - Coal Mining 4
13 - - Oil and Gas Extraction 10
14 - - Nonmetallic Minerals, Except Fuels 1
Construction 13
15 - - General Bundling Contractors 9
16 - - Heavy Construction, Except Bunding 3
17 - - Special Trade Contractors 1
Manufacturing 251
20 - - Food and Kindred Products 15
21 - - Tobacco Products 2
22 - - Textile Mill Products 1
23 - - Apparel and Other Textile Products 3
25 - - Furniture and Fixtures 7
26 - - Paper and Allied Products 3
27 - - Printing and Publishing 1 1
28 - - Chemicals and Allied Products 34
29 - - Petroleum and Coal Products 3
30 - - Rubber and Misc. Plastics Products 5
31 - - Leather and Leather Products 2
32 - - Stone, Clay, and Glass Products 2
33 - - Primary Metal Industries 9
34 - - Fabricated Metal Products 8
35 - - Industrial Machinery and Equipment 43
36 - - Electronic & Other Electric Equipment 50
37 - - Transportation Equipment 15
38 - - Instruments and Related Products 30
39 - - Misc. Manufacturing Industries 8
Wholesale Trade
50 - - Wholesale Trade ¦




52 - - Eating and Drinking Places
53 - - General Merchandise Stores
54 - - Food Stores
55 - - Automotive Dealers & Service Stations
56 - - Apparel and Accessory Stores
57 - - Furniture and Homefurnishings Stores
58 - - Eating and Drinking Places
59 - - Miscellaneous Retail
Finance, Insurance, and Real Estate
60 - - Depository Institutions
61 - - Nondepository Institutions
62 - - Security and Commodity Brokers
63 - - Insurance Carriers
64 - - Insurance Agents, Brokers, & Service
65 - - Real Estate
67 - - Holding and Other Investment Offices
Services
70 - - Hotels and Other Lodging Places
72 - - Personal Services
73 - - Business Services
75 - - Auto Repair, Services, and Parking
78 - - Motion Pictures
79 - - Amusement & Recreation Services
80 - - Health Services
82 - - Educational Services































Transportation, Communications, Electric, ...
Gas, and Sanitary Services
40 - - Railroad Transportation 1
42 - - Trucking and Warehousing 1 1
44 - - Water Transportation 5
45 - - Transportation By Air 2
47 - - Transportation Services 3
48 - - Communication 1 1
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Table 8 Daily Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 60
The sample consists of 697 repurchase announcements from 2000 to 2009, issued by companies
listed in NYSE or NASDAQ. It is grouped into Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser based on
actual purchase of stock relative to announced target of repurchase. Non-Repurchaser does not
buy back any share within one to two quarters after repurchase announcement while Repurchaser
completes the repurchase program and buys back at least the announced number of shares.
Repurchase announcement date is set as Day 0. This table lists the daily returns of the whole
sample, Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser from Day 0 to Day 60. Daily return on Day t equals




Daily Stock Return on Day 0 to Day 60 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference
____________________0) (2) (3> (2)-(3)
0 0.92 1.29 0.73 0.56
1 0.85 1.41 057 0.84
2 0.07 0.12 0.04 0.09
3 0.09 0.08 0.10 -0.02
4 0.07 0.25 -0.01 0.26
5 0.26 0.70 0.04 0.66
6 0.01 0.36 -0.17 0.53
7 -0.06 0.12 -0.15 0.27
8 0.26 0.64 0.06 0.58
9 0.08 0.23 0.00 0.22
10 0.11 -0.14 0.24 -0.38
11 0.00 0.27 -0.14 0.41
12 0.12 0.04 0.15 -0.12
13 0.16 0.40 0.04 0.36
14 0.04 0.16 -0.02 0.17
15 -0.07 0.09 -0.16 0.24
16 0.18 0.45 0.05 0.40
17 -0.28 -0.36 -0.24 -0.12
18 -0.29 -0.30 -0.28 -0.01
19 0.00 0.11 -0.06 0.17
20 -0.04 0.02 -0.07 0.08
21 0.06 0.26 -0.04 0.31
22 -0.15 0.02 -0.24 0.26
23 0.06 0.23 -0.02 0.24
24 -0.16 0.02 -0.25 0.27
25 0.00 0.03 -0.02 0.05
26 -0.10 0.25 -0.27 0.52
27 0.15 0.30 0.08 0.23
28 0.08 0.42 -0.09 0.51
29 -0.10 -0.09 -0.10 0.01
30 0.25 0.71 0.02 0.70
71
(Table 8 Continued)
Daily Stock Return on Day 0 to Day 60 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference
_____________________(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
31 -0.03 0.18 -0.13 0.31
32 0.04 0.11 0.00 0.11
33 0.01 0.29 -0.13 0.42
34 0.06 0.16 0.01 0.15
35 0.00 -0.20 0.09 -0.29
36 -0.11 0.32 -0.33 0.65
37 -0.24 -0.08 -0.32 0.25
38 0.08 0.36 -0.07 0.43
39 0.04 0.28 -0.08 0.36
40 -0.04 0.23 -0.17 0.40
41 0.07 0.19 0.01 0.18
42 -0.06 -0.52 0.17 -0.69
43 0.08 0.20 0.03 0.17
44 0.03 -0.02 0.05 -0.07
45 0.24 0.16 0.28 -0.12
46 0.00 0.14 -0.07 0.21
47 0.09 0.34 -0.03 0.37
48 0.03 -0.01 0.06 -0.07
49 0.14 0.04 0.20 -0.16
50 0.06 0.31 -0.06 0.37
51 0.03 0.02 0.04 -0.01
52 0.02 0.12 -0.03 0.15
53 -0.09 -0.20 -0.03 -0.16
54 -0.24 -0.14 -0.29 0.15
55 -0.09 0.31 -0.29 0.60
56 0.22 0.47 0.10 0.37
57 0.14 0.41 0.01 0.41
58 -0.20 -0.22 -0.19 -0.03
59 0.10 0.04 0.14 -0.09
60 0.06 0.41 -0.12 0.53
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Table 9 Cumulative Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 60
The sample consists of 697 repurchase announcements from 2000 to 2009, issued by companies
listed in NYSE or NASDAQ. It is grouped into Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser based on
actual purchase of stock relative to announced target of repurchase. Non-Repurchaser does not
buy back any share within one to two quarters after repurchase announcement while Repurchaser
completes the repurchase program and buys back at least the announced number of shares.
Repurchase announcement date is set as Day 0. This table lists the cumulative returns of the
whole sample, Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser from Day 0 to Day 60. Cumulative return on
Day t equals the price (PR005 - PX_LAST) at Day t minus the price at Day -1 then divided by the
price at Day -1.
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(Table 9 Continued)
Cumulative Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 60 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference
____________________(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
0 0.92 1.29 0.73 0.56
1 1.74 2.65 1.29 1.36
2 1.80 2.76 1.32 1.45
3 1.89 2.86 1.40 1.46
4 1.92 2.98 1.40 1.58
5 2.19 3.71 1.43 2.27
6 2.19 4.09 1.25 2.84
7 2.16 4.29 1.10 3.20
8 2.42 4.96 1.15 3.80
9 2.46 5.09 1.15 3.94
10 2.54 4.89 1.38 3.51
11 2.53 5.13 1.23 3.90
12 2.68 5.37 1.33 4.04
13 2.90 5.97 1.37 4.60
14 2.91 6.08 1.33 4.76
15 2.79 6.10 1.15 4.95
16 3.02 6.72 1.18 5.54
17 2.68 6.22 0.92 5.30
18 2.39 5.85 0.66 5.19
19 2.31 5.80 0.57 5.23
20 2.22 5.71 0.48 5.23
21 2.33 6.13 0.43 5.70
22 2.09 5.90 0.19 5.71
23 2.14 6.04 0.19 5.84
24 1.99 6.16 -0.09 6.25
25 1.98 6.15 -0.10 6.25
26 1.90 6.38 -0.34 6.73
27 2.04 6.60 -0.23 6.83
28 2.08 6.98 -0.37 7.35
29 1.94 6.81 -0.50 7.31
30 2.16 7.54 -0.52 8.05
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(Table 9 Continued)
Cumulative Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 60 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference
____________________(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
31 2.16 7.83 -0.67 8.50
32 2.22 8.02 -0.68 8.70
33 2.26 8.27 -0.73 9.01
34 2.25 8.35 -0.80 9.15
35 2.22 8.10 -0.72 8.81
36 2.05 8.26 -1.04 9.30
37 1.81 8.10 -1.33 9.43
38 1.87 8.40 -1.39 9.79
39 1.87 8.71 -1.55 10.26
40 1.86 9.01 -1.71 10.72
41 1.94 9.19 -1.68 10.86
42 1.78 8.61 -1.63 10.24
43 1.87 8.81 -1.60 10.41
44 1.94 8.79 -1.49 10.28
45 2.14 8.91 -1.23 10.14
46 2.14 9.10 -1.34 10.44
47 2.27 9.53 -1.36 10.89
48 2.22 9.29 -1.31 10.60
49 2.37 9.32 -1.09 10.42
50 2.44 9.51 -1.09 10.60
51 2.41 9.48 -1.11 10.59
52 2.37 9.60 -1.24 10.84
53 2.25 9.27 -1.25 10.52
54 1.92 9.02 -1.62 10.64
55 1.87 9.39 -1.88 11.27
56 2.07 9.75 -1.76 11.52
57 2.24 10.13 -1.69 11.83
58 2.01 9.75 -1.85 11.61
59 2.07 9.74 -1.76 11.50
60 2.16 10.25 -1.88 12.13
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Table 10 Cumulative Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 250
The sample consists of 697 repurchase announcements from 2000 to 2009, issued by companies
listed in NYSE or NASDAQ. It is grouped into Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser based on
actual purchase of stock relative to announced target of repurchase. Non-Repurchaser does not
buy back any share within one to two quarters after repurchase announcement while Repurchaser
completes the repurchase program and buys back at least the announced number of shares.
Repurchase announcement date is set as Day 0. This table lists the cumulative returns of the
whole sample, Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser from Day 0 to Day 250. Cumulative return on
Day t equals the price (PR005 - PX_LAST) at Day t minus the price at Day -1 then divided by the
price at Day -1.
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(Table 10 Continued)
Cumulative Stock Return from Day 0 to Day 250 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
0 0.92 1.29 0.73 0.56
10 2.54 4.89 1.38 3.51
20 2.22 5.71 0.48 5.23
30 2.16 7.54 -0.52 8.05
40 1.86 9.01 -1.71 10.72
50 2.44 9.51 -1.09 10.60
60 2.16 10.25 -1.88 12.13
70 1.95 10.31 -2.22 12.53
80 1.60 9.71 -2.44 12.15
90 1.04 9.28 -3.06 12.35
100 0.25 9.55 -4.39 13.94
110 -0.27 9.03 -4.91 13.94
120 -0.55 9.37 -5.50 14.86
130 -0.68 8.89 -5.45 14.33
140 -0.99 8.42 -5.69 14.11
150 -1.55 7.65 -6.14 13.79
160 -1.01 9.16 -6.09 15.24
170 -0.60 8.57 -5.17 13.73
180 -0.38 8.57 -4.84 13.41
190 0.00 7.80 -3.89 11.68
200 -0.48 6.99 -4.21 11.20
210 -0.19 7.89 -4.23 12.12
220 -0.49 7.12 -4.30 11.42
230 -0.43 7.89 -4.58 12.46
240 -0.33 7.66 -4.31 11.97
250 -0.02 7.74 -3.89 11.63
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Table 11 Abnormal Return (AR) from Day 0 to Day 60
The sample consists of 697 repurchase announcements from 2000 to 2009, issued by companies
listed in NYSE or NASDAQ. It is grouped into Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser based on
actual purchase of stock relative to announced target of repurchase. Non-Repurchaser does not
buy back any share within one to two quarters after repurchase announcement while Repurchaser
completes the repurchase program and buys back at least the announced number of shares.
I use Fama-French Three-factor Asset Pricing Model to calculate the expected returns. First I
estimate the following Three-Factor model parameters over the estimation period from Day -250
to Day -10.
Ri, - RF, = a¡ + m¡ (RM, - RF,) + s¡ SMB, + h¡ HML,
Daily Abnormal Return (AR) is the difference between actual return in Day 0 to Day 60 and the
expected return from the Three-Factor Model.
ARi, = Rit - E(Ri,) = Ri, - [a¡ + RF, + m¡ (RM, - RF.) + s¡ SMB, + h¡ HML,]
The average ARs on Day t for all observations in the sample AR All,, for Non-Repurchaser




AR_Non-Repurchaser, = S ARj, / Nj
j = i
AR_Repurchaser, = S ARk, / Nk
k = l
Nj , Nj and Nk are the number of all observations, the number of Non-Repurchaser and the




Abnormal Return on Day 0 to Day 60 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference
____________________(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
0 1.08 1.49 0.87 0.62
1 0.91 1.51 0.60 0.91
2 0.28 0.56 0.13 0.43
3 0.25 0.29 0.22 0.07
4 0.19 0.29 0.14 0.16
5 0.36 0.79 0.15 0.65
6 0.10 0.45 -0.08 0.53
7 0.13 0.36 0.02 0.34
8 0.33 0.58 0.20 0.37
9 0.12 0.22 0.06 0.16
10 0.23 -0.06 0.38 -0.44
11 0.05 0.25 -0.05 0.30
12 0.28 0.39 0.22 0.17
13 0.16 0.32 0.08 0.24
14 0.10 0.14 0.08 0.06
15 0.05 0.28 -0.06 0.34
16 0.26 0.53 0.13 0.40
17 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 0.05
18 -0.06 -0.27 0.04 -0.31
19 0.09 0.28 0.00 0.28
20 0.08 0.11 0.07 0.04
21 0.15 0.39 0.03 0.36
22 0.02 0.25 -0.09 0.34
23 0.11 0.22 0.05 0.18
24 0.00 0.05 -0.03 0.08
25 0.08 0.17 0.03 0.14
26 0.08 0.55 -0.16 0.71
27 0.33 0.48 0.25 0.23
28 0.21 0.46 0.08 0.37
29 0.02 0.09 -0.02 0.12
30 0.33 0.60 0.20 0.41
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(Table 11 Continued)
Abnormal Return on Day 0 to Day 60 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference
____________________(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
31 0.10 0.27 0.01 0.25
32 0.14 0.25 0.08 0.17
33 0.23 0.48 0.10 0.38
34 0.22 0.56 0.04 0.52
35 0.07 -0.24 0.22 -0.47
36 0.12 0.51 -0.08 0.59
37 0.02 0.11 -0.02 0.13
38 0.18 0.49 0.02 0.47
39 0.22 0.47 0.09 0.38
40 0.11 0.21 0.06 0.15
41 0.25 0.29 0.23 0.06
42 0.11 -0.35 0.35 -0.70
43 0.34 0.49 0.27 0.22
44 0.24 0.24 0.24 0.00
45 0.32 0.23 0.37 -0.13
46 0.22 0.35 0.15 0.21
47 0.22 0.35 0.16 0.19
48 0.26 0.38 0.20 0.18
49 0.40 0.17 0.51 -0.34
50 0.13 0.23 0.07 0.16
51 0.18 0.25 0.15 0.11
52 0.25 0.46 0.14 0.32
53 0.22 0.17 0.25 -0.08
54 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.03
55 -0.04 0.23 -0.17 0.41
56 0.35 0.69 0.18 0.51
57 0.30 0.47 0.22 0.25
58 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.01
59 0.28 0.32 0.26 0.05
60 0.32 0.83 0.07 0.77
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Table 12 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) from Day 0 to Day 60
The sample consists of 697 repurchase announcements from 2000 to 2009, issued by companies
listed in NYSE or NASDAQ. It is grouped into Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser based on
actual purchase of stock relative to announced target of repurchase. Non-Repurchaser does not
buy back any share within one to two quarters after repurchase announcement while Repurchaser
completes the repurchase program and buys back at least the announced number of shares.
I use Fama-French Three-factor Asset Pricing Model to calculate the expected returns. First I
estimate the following Three-Factor model parameters over the estimation period from Day -250
to Day -10.
Rit - RF, = a¡ + rrii (RM, - RF,) + s¡ SMB, + h, HML,
Daily Abnormal Return (AR) is the difference between actual return in Day 0 to Day 60 and the
expected return from the Three-Factor Model.
ARit = Rit - E(R1,) = Rj, - [a¡ + RF, + m¡ (RM, - RF,) + s¡ SMB, + h¡ HML1]
The average ARs on Day t for all observations in the sample ARAIl,, for Non-Repurchaser
AR_Non-Repurchaser, and for Repurchaser AR_Repurchaser, are calculated individually.
ARAIl, = S ARj, / ?
i = l
N,
AR_Non-Repurchaser, = S ARj, / Nj
J = I
Nk
AR_Repurchaser, = S ARk, / Nk
k = l
Ni , Nj and Nk are the number of all observations, the number of Non-Repurchaser and the
number of Repurchaser in the sample and N¡ = Nj + Nk. In this sample N¡ = 697, Nj = 232 and Nk
= 465.






Cumulative Abnormal Return from Day 0 to Day 60 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference
__________________(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
0 1.08 1.49 0.87 0.62
1 1.99 3.01 1.48 1.53
2 2.26 3.57 1.61 1.96
3 2.51 3.86 1.83 2.03
4 2.70 4.16 1.97 2.19
5 3.06 4.95 2.12 2.83
6 3.15 5.40 2.03 3.37
7 3.29 5.76 2.05 3.71
8 3.61 6.34 2.25 4.08
9 3.73 6.56 2.32 4.24
10 3.96 6.49 2.70 3.80
11 4.01 6.74 2.65 4.09
12 4.29 7.13 2.87 4.27
13 4.45 7.45 2.95 4.50
14 4.55 7.60 3.03 4.56
15 4.61 7.88 2.98 4.90
16 4.87 8.41 3.11 5.30
17 4.80 8.37 3.02 5.35
18 4.74 8.11 3.06 5.05
19 4.83 8.39 3.06 5.33
20 4.91 8.50 3.13 5.37
21 5.06 8.89 3.16 5.73
22 5.09 9.14 3.07 6.07
23 5.19 9.36 3.11 6.25
24 5.19 9.41 3.08 6.33
25 5.27 9.58 3.11 6.47
26 5.35 10.13 2.96 7.18
27 5.67 10.62 3.21 7.41
28 5.88 11.07 3.29 7.78
29 5.89 11.16 3.27 7.90
30 6.23 11.77 3.46 8.30
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(Table 12 Continued)
Cumulative Abnormal Return from Day 0 to Day 60 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
31 6.32 12.03 3.48 8.56
32 6.46 12.28 3.56 8.73
33 6.69 12.76 3.66 9.10
34 6.91 13.32 3.70 9.62
35 6.97 13.08 3.93 9.15
36 7.09 13.59 3.85 9.74
37 7.11 13.70 3.83 9.87
38 7.29 14.19 3.85 10.34
39 7.51 14.66 3.94 10.72
40 7.62 14.87 4.00 10.87
41 7.87 15.17 4.23 10.94
42 7.98 14.81 4.57 10.24
43 8.32 15.30 4.84 10.46
44 8.56 15.53 5.08 10.46
45 8.88 15.77 5.44 10.32
46 9.10 16.12 5.59 10.53
47 9.32 16.46 5.75 10.71
48 9.57 16.84 5.95 10.89
49 9.97 17.01 6.46 10.55
50 10.10 17.24 6.53 10.71
51 10.28 17.50 6.68 10.82
52 10.53 17.96 6.82 11.14
53 10.75 18.13 7.07 11.06
54 10.79 18.19 7.10 11.09
55 10.75 18.42 6.93 11.50
56 11.10 19.11 7.10 12.01
57 11.40 19.58 7.32 12.26
58 11.55 19.73 7.46 12.27
59 11.83 20.05 7.73 12.32
60 12.15 20.88 7.79 13.09
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Table 13 Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) from Day 0 to Day 250
The sample consists of 697 repurchase announcements from 2000 to 2009, issued by companies
listed in NYSE or NASDAQ. It is grouped into Non-Repurchaser and Repurchaser based on
actual purchase of stock relative to announced target of repurchase. Non-Repurchaser does not
buy back any share within one to two quarters after repurchase announcement while Repurchaser
completes the repurchase program and buys back at least the announced number of shares.
I use Fama-French Three-factor Asset Pricing Model to calculate the expected returns. First I
estimate the following Three-Factor model parameters over the estimation period from Day -250
to Day -10.
Ri, - RF, = a¡ + m¡ (RM, - RF,) + s¡ SMB, + h¡ HML,
Daily Abnormal Return (AR) is the difference between actual return in Day 0 to Day 250 and the
expected return from the Three-Factor Model.
ARi, = Rit - E(Rit) = Rj, - [ai + RF, + m¡ (RM, - RF1) + s¡ SMB, + h, HML,]
The average ARs on Day t for all observations in the sample AR_A11,, for Non-Repurchaser





AR_Non-Repurchaser, = S ARj, / Nj
j = i
Nt
AR_Repurchaser, = S ARk, / Nk
k = l
? , Nj and Nk are the number of all observations, the number of Non-Repurchaser and the
number of Repurchaser in the sample and N¡ = Nj + Nk. In this sample N¡ = 697, Nj = 232 and Nk
= 465.






Cumulative Abnormal Return from Day 0 to Day 250 (%)
Day ALL Non-Repurchaser Repurchaser Difference
____________________(1) (2) (3) (2)-(3)
0 1.08 1.49 0.87 0.62
10 3.96 6.49 2.70 3.80
20 4.91 8.50 3.13 5.37
30 6.23 11.77 3.46 8.30
40 7.62 14.87 4.00 10.87
50 10.10 17.24 6.53 10.71
60 12.15 20.88 7.79 13.09
70 14.09 23.91 9.19 14.73
80 16.07 25.37 11.43 13.94
90 18.04 26.93 13.60 13.33
100 20.19 30.28 15.15 15.12
110 22.16 32.64 16.93 15.72
120 24.60 35.99 18.92 17.07
130 27.56 39.14 21.78 17.37
140 30.73 42.65 24.79 17.86
150 33.99 46.18 27.90 18.28
160 38.03 50.75 31.69 19.06
170 41.84 54.22 35.66 18.55
180 45.88 58.31 39.68 18.63
190 50.39 62.45 44.37 18.07
200 53.55 65.20 47.74 17.46
210 57.63 70.06 51.43 18.64
220 61.60 73.62 55.60 18.01
230 65.63 77.45 59.74 17.71
240 69.41 81.04 63.61 17.43
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